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Abstract
Recent research documents a female advantage in several important long-term outcomes
among children raised in single-parent households, and highlights the importance of non-cognitive
skills for explaining these gaps. Understanding the source of differences in non-cognitive skills is
complicated due to the presence of many interrelated and often unobservable inputs. One potential
explanation for such gaps is that boys and girls receive different levels of inputs in single-parent
versus two-parent households. This paper provides empirical evidence that input levels change
differentially by gender across household structures and hence may facilitate gender gaps in non-
cognitive skills. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and accompanying Child
Development Supplement, I estimate gender differences in parental time investments, defined as
the amount of time parents spend participating in activities with the child, around changes in house-
hold composition. I find that, although both boys and girls experience reductions in parental time
investments following a change from a two-parent to single-mother household, boys experience a
larger reduction than girls. The largest difference is found in fathers’ time investments on week-
days, for which boys lose an additional 24 minutes per day (35% of average paternal weekday
investments). Moreover, there is little to no evidence that single mothers compensate for the loss
by increasing time investments to boys relative to girls.
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1 Introduction
Recent research has documented the poor performance of boys, especially those rasied in
single-mother households, on a number of critical dimensions including cognitive performance
[Cunha and Heckman, 2008, Heckman and Mosso, 2014, Kristoffersen et al., 2015], educational
attainment [Autor et al., 2016b, Becker et al., 2010, Fortin et al., 2015, Goldin et al., 2006,
Jacob, 2002, Owens, 2016], labor market outcomes [Autor et al., 2016a, Deming, 2016,
Heckman et al., 2006, Heckman et al., 2013], arrests [Heckman et al., 2013], and risky be-
haviors [Heckman et al., 2006]. For example, among children born into married households,
males are more likely than females to be employed at age 30, but the opposite is true among
individuals born to non-married households [Autor et al., 2016a]. An underlying theme of this
research is that differences in non-cognitive skills play an important role in generating gender gaps
in the other outcomes. For example, Bertrand and Pan [2013] find that gender gaps in externalizing
behavior1 and school suspensions are substantially larger among children from single-mother
households. Identifying and understanding the mechanisms that generate these gender gaps is
important for designing policies or treatments to improve not only boys’ non-cognitive skills,
but to potentially improve the critically important outcomes mentioned above. In particular,
determining how much of the single-mother household gender gaps in non-cognitive skills are due
to differential returns to inputs versus differential levels of inputs is a first order concern. Bertrand
and Pan2 find little support for a differential inputs story, and attribute the wider non-cognitive
skill gaps found in single-mother households to differential returns to inputs. However, because
of the inability of data sets to capture all relevant inputs, differences in omitted inputs can be
misattributed as differential returns to observable inputs. This paper expands on prior literature
by providing empirical evidence that differential levels of inputs may also contribute to the
1Externalizing behavior is based on a series of questions about the child’s behavior, capturing
the frequency with which the child acts out. More specifically, questions ask how frequently the
child argues, fights, gets angry, acts impulsively, or disrupts activity. The externalizing behavior
measures used by Bertrand and Pan [2013] are based on teacher ratings.
2Using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey - Kindergarten, they find that the
fifth grade gender gap in externalizing behavior, favoring girls, is nearly twice as large among
children from single-mother households [Bertrand and Pan, 2013]. Similarly, they find that the
eighth grade gender gap in suspensions is more than twice as large among children from single-
mother households.
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non-cognitive skill gaps.
The apparent effects of household structure on gender gaps in non-cognitive skills and
long-run outcomes is striking, but disentangling the underlying mechanisms is complicated by
the presence of many interrelated and often unobserved inputs. Parental time investments, de-
fined in this paper as the amount of time that parents spend participating in activities with their
children,3 are potentially important to the development of non-cognitive skills. If parental time
investments are important in the production of non-cognitive skills, then differences in time in-
vestments could help explain gender gaps in non-cognitive skills and related outcomes (for exam-
ple, non-cognitive skills promote the production of cognitive skills [Cunha and Heckman, 2008,
Del Boca and Mancini, 2013, Del Boca et al., 2017, Heckman and Mosso, 2014]).
In this paper, I study gender gaps in parental time investments as they relate to household
structure (e.g., two-parent versus single-mother households), and contribute to the literature by
measuring changes in the level of parental time investments around transitions in household com-
position. The emphasis is on testing the plausibility of the hypothesis that gaps in non-cognitive
skills are driven by differential time investments, while abstracting from the possibility that boys
and girls may have differential returns to parental time investments.4 Because fathers tend to spend
relatively more time with boys as they age [Baker and Milligan, 2013, Lundberg et al., 2007], and
single-parent households are more often headed by the mother, growing up in a single-parent
household could be more detrimental for boys in terms of time investments.5
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) [2014] and the accompanying Child
Development Supplement (CDS), I obtain direct measures of parental time investments and use
within-child variation to estimate differential changes in investments by gender around changes
3As opposed to time that the parent is present but not participating in any activity with the child,
which has been referred to as secondary [Lundberg et al., 2007] or accessible [Yeung et al., 2001]
time in some prior research using PSID time diary data. In contrast, Lundberg et al. refer to time
parents spend actively participating in activities with the child as direct time.
4Depending on how returns to parental time investments differ between boys and girls, differ-
ential returns could either compound or mitigate the effects of differential inputs on outcomes.
However, this question is not directly addressed here. Rather, the focus is on testing whether
investment levels differ across household types.
5 Dahl and Moretti [2008] provide more general evidence of parental bias in favor of boys,
showing that household structure is related to the sex of the first born child, and that fathers are
more likely to obtain custody of sons following a separation.
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in household composition. While investments are lower for both boys and girls in single-mother
homes relative to two-parent households, the reduction is more substantial for boys. I find the
largest differences in paternal weekday investments, for which boys lose 24 minutes per day more
than girls lose, which is about 35 percent of the average paternal weekday investment during the
first CDS survey. I also find that boys suffer greater time investment losses than girls through
paternal weekend investments, but the magnitude is more sensitive to specification. Combining
the weekday and weekend data, I estimate that paternal investments decline by 2.3 hours more
per week for boys in single-mother homes than for girls in single-mother homes, which is over 20
percent of the average weekly paternal investment during the first wave of the CDS. The investment
gap is larger during adolescence, during which boys in single-mother homes lose over 3.3 hours per
week more than girls. Estimating the gaps by activity type reveals that boys experience relatively
large decreases in investments through leisure activities,6 which account for more of the gap than
any other activity type. Furthermore, there is little to no evidence that mothers compensate for
the additional loss by increasing investments to boys relative to girls.7 These findings support the
hypothesis that time investments are a plausible mechanism to help explain the sensitivity of the
magnitude of gender gaps in non-cognitive outcomes to household structure.
One advantage of the approach used in this paper is that, by focusing on children who un-
derwent changes in household structure, the findings do not rely on cross-sectional comparisons
of investments across individuals. Rather, the findings are based on comparisons of within-child
changes in investments.8 Another advantage of this approach is the use of a direct measure of
parental time investments, calculated from twenty-four hour time diaries collected as part of the
Child Development Supplement to the PSID. While it is important to recognize that no single input
measure can capture all relevant aspects of such a complex production process, the use of a direct
measure of parental investments allows for transparency and clear interpretation of the results.
To better understand the source of the non-cognitive gender gaps, prior research attempts
6Using cross-sectional CDS data, Lundberg et al. [2007] also find more pronounced preferences
of fathers to spend time with sons in active and passive leisure.
7This finding supports a cross-sectional finding from Lundberg et al. [2007] that mothers do not
compensate for the loss in investments when the father is not present.
8 See Lundberg et al. [2007] and Yeung et al. [2001] for examples of research considering
cross-sectional difference in time investments using PSID and CDS data.
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to quantify how much of the gap is due to differential inputs and how much is due to differential
returns to inputs. Some prior studies find more support for differential returns to inputs. For exam-
ple, Bertrand and Pan [2013] find no systematic differences in the home environment or investment
measures9 that explain the sensitivity of male outcomes to family structure and parental inputs.10
The authors conclude that, although inputs are lower for both boys and girls in single-mother rela-
tive to two-parent households, the behavior of boys is much more responsive to these inputs. This
leads to a larger gender gap among those in single-mother homes and supports the hypothesis that
gender gaps in non-cognitive skills are driven by differential returns to inputs.11 While investment
levels and differential returns to investments both likely play a role in generating gender gaps in
non-cognitive skills, separating the importance of returns and levels of each input is complicated
by the fact that many inputs are correlated with household structure. The measured returns to one
input can be conflated with the levels of and/or returns to omitted inputs [Autor et al., 2016a].12
The main finding of this paper, that the relationship between household structure and parental time
investments differs by gender, adds to the literature on the relative contributions of differential
inputs and differential returns to inputs to the gender gaps in non-cognitive skills by providing
evidence that differential inputs may play a role in determining the size of the gender gaps.
Investigating whether investment levels depend on household structure differentially for boys
and girls also adds to the evidence on the role of childhood environment, as opposed to pre-natal
differences, in explaining the gender gap. More generally, the post-natal environment, includ-
ing neighborhood and school quality, appears to play a role in the production of non-cognitive
9Bertrand and Pan [2013] use data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study - Kindergarten
Cohort. They use input measures such as the HOME index, Warmth index, and whether the child
was spanked last week, all of which are correlated with household structure. The HOME index
is based on parent responses to six questions about the activities that the child participates in
and activities the parent participates in with the child. All of the questions were asked during the
child’s kindergarten year. TheWarmth index, also referred to as emotional supportiveness, is based
on parent responses to a series of statements about their child, e.g. child and I often have warm,
close times together and being a parent is harder than I thought it would be. Responses were given
in the Spring of the child’s kindergarten year. See Bertrand and Pan, 2013 for more details.
10Likewise, Bertrand and Pan [2013] also do not find systematic differences in the gender differ-
entials by characteristics of kindergarten class environment.
11Other research shows that more educated and higher income parents invest more time into their
children [Guryan et al., 2008]. Unless this varies differentially by gender, it could not on its own
explain the difference in gender gaps across the hh/ses distribution found in Autor et al. [2016a].
12Autor et al. [2016a] make a similar point about parental investments varying differentially
between boys and girls. This paper tests whether this is true for parental time investments.
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skills [Autor et al., 2016a, Autor et al., 2016b, Chetty et al., 2016a, Chetty and Hendren, 2016,
Chetty et al., 2016b]. Autor et al. [2016a] compare a fetal origins explanation with a post-natal en-
vironment explanation for the changes across the SES distribution in within-family gender gaps in
long-run outcomes. They find that changes in within-family gender gaps are unrelated to pre-natal
differences, suggesting that the post-natal environment is critical in explaining the changing gender
gap across the SES gradient and household structures. This finding is supported by the particular
sensitivity of boys to neighborhood characteristics [Chetty and Hendren, 2016]. However, gender
gaps remain even after accounting for differences in school and neighborhood quality,13 suggesting
that other mechanisms are at play. Because non-cognitive skills continue to develop at later stages
in child development (i.e. adolescence) [Heckman and Mosso, 2014], the importance of time in-
vestments in shaping non-cognitive skills and related outcomes is plausible even for individuals
experiencing investment losses during adolescence.
After documenting the gender gaps in the levels of parental investments, I employ the same
methods based on individual fixed effects to measure changes in externalizing, internalizing, and
positive behavior14 around changes in household composition. Counterintuitively, boys display
better externalizing and positive behavior in single-mother homes relative to girls, which suggests
a more puzzling relationship between time investments, household structure, and child behavior.
However, these findings are based on parental ratings, which is a limitation of the CDS data.
One concern with parent-based behavioral ratings is that parental perception of child behavior
could change differentially for boys and girls around changes in household structure, even if actual
behavior does not.
A description of the PSID and CDS data is provided in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the
estimation procedure, which is based on individual fixed effects. Section 4 outlines results on
the relationship between household composition and the gender gap in time investments, and a
13 Autor et al. [2016a] find that neighborhood and school quality can explain at most one-third
of the sibling gender gap.
14These are three behavioral measures included in the CDS data. Externalizing behavior is dis-
cussed more in footnote 1. Internalizing behavior is based on a series of questions about the child’s
frequency of exhibiting some inwardly negative behavior. Positive behavior is based on a series of
questions that ask how "like" the child it is to exhibit some positive behavior. Ratings are based on
responses of the child’s primary caregiver.
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brief discussion of the changes in behavioral measures around changes in household composition.
Section 5 concludes and discusses the implications of the main findings.
2 Data
The CDS is a survey that was administered to children of PSID families in three waves (1997,
2002/2003, and 2007), and includes time diaries, and surveys of the children and their parents. The
most critical component of the CDS for the purpose of this paper is the collection of twenty-four
hour time diaries that catalog the activities of each child for one weekday and one weekend day.
The diary data are at the activity level and include information on the duration and participants for
each activity. I use the time diaries to construct measures of parental investments by summing time
that each parent spent participating in activities with the child in each diary.15 Every child in the
CDS was assigned one randomly selected weekend day and weekday to record their activities. The
first wave of the CDS includes children under age 13, and they are eligible for the CDS until they
turn 18.16 About 2,900 participants completed at least one time diary for CDS-I. More than 2,500
and 1,400 completed at least one diary for CDS-II and CDS-III, respectively. These add up to a
total of 6,915 child-year observations. A total of 3,330 children completed at least one time diary
in any period, and 1,086 completed at least one in all three waves. More than 1,400 completed at
least one diary for exactly two of the waves.
There are two features of the data that are critical for the following analysis. The first is
the presence of the time diaries used to calculate parental investments. Investments are calcu-
lated by summing time spent participating in activities with mother/father17 across activity-level
15In the time diary data, there are two indicators that describe participation and presence of each
parent for every activity. One of them is an indicator for whether the parent was participating in
the activity with the child. The other tells whether the parent was present, but not participating.
I use the indicator for whether the parent was participating in the activity to construct the time
investment measures.
16The age limits refer to the child’s age during an initial screening. There are a small number of
cases for which the child’s age was outside of these limits at the point that the time diary data was
recorded.
17The investment measures only include time with biological/adoptive parents. Similarly, when
referring to parental presence in the household, I am referring to biological/adoptive parents only.
For example, a child who lives in the same household as their biological/adoptive mother and a
step-father is considered to be living in a single-mother household for the purposes of this study.
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data for each child. This is done separately for each weekend and weekday diary. In addition, I
construct weekly investment measures to help summarize total investments by summing the week-
day investment multiplied by five with the weekend investment multiplied by two. Second, I use
information from the CDS surveys18 to construct household composition indicators for each child-
wave observation, including presence of the child’s biological/adoptive mother and father. I focus
on comparing time investments for children in two-parent and single-mother households.
Figures 1 through 4 display cross-sectional differences in investments across gender and
household type from wave I of the CDS. Figure 1 graphs local polynomials of investments by
age, for boys and girls who were in two-parent or single-mother households during the first wave.
Weekday time spent with mothers decreases dramatically with age for all gender and household
type combinations. The average investments across these groups are within about thirty minutes
of each other at every age in Figure 1. However, at ages where investments differ, it is gener-
ally true that mothers invest more time in daughters than sons, and that mothers in two-parent
households spend more time participating in activities with their children. Figure 2 displays the
analogous estimates for maternal weekend investments by age. The overall levels of the invest-
ments are higher on weekend days, and investment gaps between genders and household types are
also more pronounced. For example, in Figure 1 the patterns for weekday maternal investments
to girls are almost identical for those in two-parent and single-mother households, but in Figure 2
single-mother’s weekend investments to girls are lower at every age than their two-parent house-
hold counterparts. The gap is roughly between thirty and sixty minutes at every age, which is a
significant gap relative to that in Figure 1 where the lines are almost indistinguishable at some
ages. Similarly, there is a persistent gap between household types for maternal investments to boys
across all ages, with boys in two-parent households receiving larger investments. Furthermore, the
gender gap in mother’s weekend investments appears to widen with age, with mothers spending
more time participating in activities with girls than with boys. Both Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the
importance of the child’s age when considering time investments, as investments decrease sharply
with age. For example, mothers invest between 6 and 6-1/2 hours on weekend days to their infant
18The household structure variables are constructed from the Primary Caregiver Child File, which
is part of the CDS.
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and toddler daughters, but that number is roughly 4 hours for 12 and 13 year olds.
Figures 3 and 4 graph paternal investments from the weekday and weekend diaries, respec-
tively. Fathers generally invest less time than mothers do across all household types and genders,
but the decrease in investments with age is less drastic, especially for boys. In fact, Figure 3 shows
that weekday paternal investments are similarly low for both boys and girls in single-mother house-
holds across all ages. A slight increase in paternal weekend investments to boys in single-mother
homes, shown in Figure 4, leads to a small gap that appears to increase with age. The increasing
gender gap in weekend paternal investments is more apparent in two-parent homes. From Figure
4, both boys and girls in two-parent homes receive more than 4 hours in weekend paternal in-
vestments up until about age 5, but a steady decline in weekend paternal investments for girls in
two-parent homes leads to that number dropping below 3 hours around age 12. However, weekend
paternal investments for boys in two-parent homes remain steady at around 4 hours for all ages
represented in the graph.
One implication of these investment patterns, particularly for boys in two-parent households,
is that the proportion of total investments that come from fathers is increasing with age. This is
shown more directly in Figures 5 and 6, which graph the proportion of the total parental invest-
ments19 that come from each parent for those in two-parent households in the first wave for boys
and girls, respectively. The proportions are roughly the same for infant and toddler boys and girls,
with each receiving almost 70 percent of total parental investments from their mother. The pro-
portions change quite differently for boys and girls as they age. For girls, maternal investments
remain relatively high, never dropping below about 65 percent of total parental investments. How-
ever, maternal investments dip below 55 percent of total parental investments by about age 12 for
boys. Another implication of the gender differences in the investments-age relationship is that one
might expect the differential effect of household composition on parental time investments to differ
by age. The increasing relative importance of paternal investments for boys, apparent in Figures 4
and 5, suggests that the potential for investment losses, relative to girls, increases with age.
19Total investments, Totali, were calculated by weighting the weekday,WDi, and weekend,WEi,
investments to construct a weekly investment, such that Totali = 5 ·WDi+ 2 ·WEi. The weekly
measure of time spent with each parent divided by the total weekly measure is the proportion of
total parental investment from that parent. The two values add to one by construction.
8
Two important points of Figures 1 - 6 are that investments generally decline with age and
that the relationship between investments and age differs by gender. These patterns could reflect
the way parents spread their time with multiple children (Price, 2008) and the apparent preference
of fathers to spend relatively more time with their sons (Baker and Milligan, 2013). In most cases,
across all age groups and household structures, mothers spend a little more total time with girls,
and fathers spend a little more with boys, on average. The figures demonstrate how important age
is when evaluating time investments and suggests that using flexible controls for age is necessary
in the analysis that follows.
Table 1 summarizes the time investment variables and covariates by gender and household
type. In particular, I separate out the individuals who underwent a change in household structure,
because they are critical for estimation. Columns 3 and 4 display average characteristics for boys
who underwent a change at some point. Column 3 includes boys who lived with both parents in the
first period, meaning that the change in structure for them is going from living with both parents to
living with less than both parents. On the other hand, column 4 includes individuals who underwent
changes, but did not have both parents in the household in the first period. Columns 7 and 8
display the averages for girls who underwent a change in household composition at some point.
The first row summarizes total weekly maternal investments, which was constructed by summing
weekday investments (row 2) multiplied by five with weekend investments (row 3) multiplied
by two. Girls receive larger maternal investments than boys across all household types. Girls
who were always in two-parent households received about 26.6 hours in maternal investments per
week, relative to 24.8 hours per week for boys. The gap in maternal investments for children in
two-parent households that eventually split, comparing column 6 with column 2, is about 3 hours
per week, with girls receiving more investments. Both boys and girls in households that eventually
split received larger maternal investments than those who were always in a two-parent household.
From column 3, boys in families that eventually split received 25.5 hours per week on average,
and those in households that never split received 24.8 hours per week. Similarly, girls in two-
parent households that eventually had a change in composition received 27.4 hours per week in
maternal investments, but those in two-parent households that never split received 26.6 hours per
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week. These comparisons may be misleading, because the household structure categories are also
correlated with age. For example, girls in two-parent households that never experience a change
are just under 7 years old on average, but the average age of girls in two-parent households that
eventually split is under 5 years. The difference is similar for boys. This, along with Figures
1 - 4, demonstrates why it is important to control flexibly for age when estimating gender gaps
in the relationship between investments and household structure. Not only is age correlated with
investments differentially by gender, it is also correlated with household structure. With that in
mind, it is similarly true that boys in two-parent households that eventually split received more
paternal investments than those who were always in two-parent households, 16.7 and 16.3 hours
per week, respectively. However, the opposite is true for girls, with girls who were always in
a two-parent household receiving nearly 2 hours more per week in paternal investments, despite
being roughly 2 years older on average.
From column 3, boys who experience a change in household composition but are in a two-
parent household during wave I are about 2 years younger than boys who do not experience a
change and are in a two-parent household at wave I, 4.6 years old and 6.5 years old, respectively.
Boys in two-parent households who eventually see a change in household composition also have
a little over one sibling in the household on average, whereas those in two-parent households who
experience no change have about 1.3 siblings in the household. The differences are similar for
girls. Girls who experience a change in household structure, but lived with both parents in the
first period were 4.9 years old on average and had 1.1 siblings in the household at wave I, and
those who are in a two-parent household and don’t experience a change were about 6.8 years old
with almost 1.3 siblings in the household. The racial composition of boys and girls in two-parent
households that eventually split are also similar. In both cases, there are roughly equal percentages
of black and white individuals in the subsamples, and the percentage of Hispanic individuals is
relatively small. Lastly, the percentage of children in two-parent households in which their parents
are married is about 86 percent for girls and nearly 90 percent for boys.
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3 Estimation
The main contribution of this paper is the estimation of the gender gaps in time investments in
single-mother households. To estimate the gender gaps, I use individual fixed effects regressions,
including interactions between a dummy for being in a single-mother household with male and
female dummy variables. The gender gap is the difference in the coefficients on the male and
female interactions.
Tit = a+bM ·Mi ·MOit+bF ·Fi ·MOit+b3 ·Otherit+Xit ·G+ ci+ eit (1)
The left hand side variable in equation (1), Tit , represents some measure of parental time
investments that child i received in wave t. For most specifications the investment measures are
the amount of time that child i spent participating in activities with his or her mother/father from
the weekday/weekend twenty-four hour time diary, measured in hours. In the main specification,
I report estimates for the weekday and weekend investments, as well as a total weekly investment
constructed as a weighted sum of the weekday and weekend investments. I construct the total
investment by summing the weekday investment multiplied by five with the weekend investment
multiplied by two. For ease of reporting and because using the weekly measure better reflects
the effects on total investments, I focus on reporting estimates for total investments in alternate
specifications that use the hours measure. I also include estimates based on equation (1) that
replace the hours measures with a dummy variable indicating whether the child had any positive
investment from his or her mother/father. In that specification, the outcome of interest is equal to
one when the time investment is greater than zero for the given time diary.20
The independent variables of interest are the interaction terms, where Mi and Fi represent
male and female dummy variables, and MOit represents a dummy variable indicating whether
child i was in a single-mother household at wave t. There are two other types of household struc-
tures to consider. Living in the same household as both parents is the omitted category, and Otherit
indicates whether child i was in some other household type during wave t. The third category,
20For the weekday/weekend estimates, Tit = 1 when the weekday/weekend maternal/paternal
time investment is greater than zero, and Tit = 0 otherwise. For the total investment regressions,
Tit = 1 when either the weekday or the weekend maternal/paternal investment is positive.
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Otherit , is constructed to make the categories mutually exclusive and comprehensive.21 I focus
on estimating gender gaps in investments for those living in single-mother households, because
children are more likely to live with their mother if the family is separated. Furthermore, if fathers
invest relatively more in boys as they get older, not having their father present in the household
could hinder development for boys, even if not for girls. Xit represents a vector of time-varying ob-
servable characteristics including child’s age and age-squared interacted with gender, the number
of biological siblings in the household, and indicators for CDS wave, presence of stepparents in
or out of the household, and marital status of parents in the household.22 The gender specific age
terms are important, because investments are differentially related to age by gender.23 Child level,
time-constant characteristics are indicated by ci, and eit indicates a period specific error term.
I estimate equation (1) using individual level fixed effects, so that bˆM is a fixed effects es-
timator of investments that boys receive in single-mother households relative to those in two-
parent households. Similarly, bˆF is an estimator for investments that girls receive in single-
mother households. The parameter of interest is the difference between the two investment levels,
bDi f f = bM bF . When bˆDi f f < 0, that suggests that boys receive relatively low levels of invest-
ments in single-mother households, and bˆDi f f > 0 suggests that boys in single-mother households
are relatively well off in terms of time investments.
Because I estimate bDi f f using fixed effects, it is necessary to view some boys and some
girls in a single-mother household during one wave and in a two-parent household in another. The
procedure explained above does not restrict the direction of the change in household structure.
Those who transition from a single-mother to two-parent household contribute to the estimates
in the same way as those who go from a two-parent to a single-mother household. However, we
might expect these two groups to be different. Omitted characteristics and behavior can directly
influence transitions, as well as the level of time investments. The ages at which the child is in
21Otherit = 1 if the child was in a single-father household, or in a household with neither parent.
This makes the estimated coefficient difficult to interpret but these household structures are not the
focus of this study.
22Estimates that also condition on the day of the week that the diary references are included in
Tables A.1 and A.2 of the appendix. Results are not sensitive to this specification.
23In an alternate specification, I include a set of age dummy variables interacted with gender.
The results are robust to this specification.
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each household structure is also related to the direction of the transition. If the size of the gender
gap differs with age, it could lead to estimating different gaps depending on the direction of the
transition. I report separate estimates for the sample of those who lived with both parents in the
first period and for those who did not to examine this possible heterogeneity. In addition, I examine
investment gap heterogeneity by age and race, and decompose the gaps into specific activities to
determine which are the main contributors to the differential investment losses.
Lastly, I investigate differential changes in parental ratings of non-cognitive behavior around
the changes in household composition. Learning more about how parental time investments factor
into the generation of non-cognitive skills is a primary concern. I examine differential changes by
gender in externalizing behavior, internalizing behavior, and positive behavior24 around changes in
household structure. To do this, I estimate equation (1) using individual fixed effects and replacing
the time investment measures with the behavioral measures. While these data are well-suited for
measuring parental time investments, using parent-rated behavior measures may be problematic
because parental perceptions of the child’s behavior could change differentially by gender around
changes in household structure.
4 Results
Before presenting the estimated gender gaps from the fixed effects regressions, I will briefly discuss
OLS estimates of equation (1). Table 2 shows estimates of the male and female interaction terms,
as well as the estimated difference between the male and female interaction terms, for maternal
and paternal total, weekday, and weekend investments. Estimates in Table 2 are conditional on a
set of covariates, including male and female interactions with age and age-squared. The estimated
coefficient on the male interaction with single-mother household in the equation for total maternal
24Each of the three ratings is based on a series of questions asked to the child’s primary caregiver.
Externalizing and internalizing behavior questions ask how frequently the child exhibits some ex-
ternalizing (i.e. acting out) or internalizing (i.e. inward negative) behavior and have three possible
answers: not true, sometimes true, or often true. The data are coded so that higher scores mean
that the child exhibits more problematic behavior. The positive behavior questions ask how like
the child certain behaviors/characteristics are (e.g. cheerful, not impulsive), and are answered on
a one to five scale, where one means the behavior/characteristic is not at all like the child and five
means it is totally like the child. A higher score on the positive behavior rating means that the child
displays less problematic behavior.
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investments from column 1, suggests that boys in single-mother households receive 1.24 hours per
week more from their mothers, relative to children in two-parent households. Subtracting the coef-
ficient on the female and single-mother household interaction gives the estimated gender difference
in investments. Again from column 1, the estimated gender gap is 0.1 hours per week, suggesting
that boys are relatively well off in terms of maternal investments. We can decompose the total
difference by looking at the weekday and weekend gaps. From column 2, the estimated gap is
-0.049, meaning that boys in single-mother households received roughly 3 fewer minutes in week-
day investments than girls. On the other hand, from column 3, boys in single-mother households
received roughly eleven minutes more per weekend day than girls. In this case, the weekend gap
outweighs the weekday gap, and the estimated total difference is positive. The estimates for pater-
nal investments are shown in columns 4 through 6. In column 4 we see that boys in single-mother
homes have relatively large decreases in investments, compared to girls, estimated at -7.5 and -6.5
hours per week, respectively, leading to an estimated gender gap of about one hour per week. The
concern with using OLS to estimate the gender gap is that it relies heavily on cross-sectional vari-
ation, but both family structure and gender are likely correlated with unobservable determinants
of time investments. The fixed effects estimator is preferable because it restricts the comparison
to changes in investments within individuals who underwent a change in household structure with
changes in investments for children who remain in two-parent households. The remainder of the
reported estimates of equation (1) are fixed effects estimates.
Table 3 reports fixed effects estimates of the gender gap in time investments based on equa-
tion (1) for maternal/paternal total, weekday, and weekend investments. The specification reported
in panel A does not include any control variables, and the specification in panel B includes the full
set of controls. Column 4 of panel A shows estimates for total weekly paternal investments with-
out controls. The estimated gap in paternal investments is -1.92, meaning that paternal investments
drop by nearly 2 hours more per week for boys in single-mother homes than they do for girls. After
adding controls, while the estimated coefficients on the gender/single-mother interactions change,
the estimated total gap in paternal investments remains similar. For example, the estimated coef-
ficient on the male interaction with single-mother household goes from -10.3 without controls to
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-7.3 after adding controls. Similarly, the estimated coefficient on the female interaction goes from
-8.4 without controls to -4.9 with controls. In both cases, the estimates suggest that paternal invest-
ments drop for boys and girls after going to single-mother households, but the decrease is relatively
large for boys. From panel B, the estimated gender difference in total weekly paternal investments
is -2.36, which is similar to the estimate from panel A, suggesting that paternal investments drop
by nearly 2-1/2 hours more per week for boys in single-mother homes than they do for girls. That
estimate is both economically significant, as the estimated gap is more than 20 percent of average
paternal investments across gender and household types during wave I, and statistically important
with a standard error of 1.08. The gender difference is strongest through weekday investments, for
which the estimated gap, from column 5 of panel B, is -0.4 with a standard error of 0.15. That
equates to roughly 24 minutes per weekday and is about 35 percent of average paternal weekday
investments during wave I. To put the size of that estimate in perspective, consider Figure 3 again,
which graphs paternal weekday investments during the first wave of the CDS. Average paternal
investments to boys and girls in two-parent households generally lie between 1 and 2 hours, de-
pending on age. There is a slight downward trend, and the line drops below 1-1/2 hours by about
age 7 for both boys and girls. The estimated difference of 24 minutes represents about twenty per-
cent of the average paternal weekday investment in two-parent households at the lower end and 40
percent at the higher end. Although the weekday gap drives about 80 percent of the estimated total
weekly gap, the gap in paternal weekend investments is also negative, -0.22 hours, but only drives
about 20 percent of the gap because of it’s smaller magnitude and lower weight in the makeup of
the total weekly investment measure.
The difference between the OLS and fixed effects estimates for total paternal time can be
explained by examining how each individual contributes to each estimator. In the OLS estimator,
those who transition from two-parent to single-parent households, or vice versa, are in the omitted
group (two-parent household) in one period and in a different group in another. With the fixed
effects estimator, they are never in the omitted category. Girls who eventually go through a two-
parent to single-mother transition have a lower baseline input than boys who make the same tran-
sition, because paternal investments to girls in two-parent households decrease as they get older.
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Since paternal investments are very low for both genders when their father is not in the house-
hold, the within-child drop in paternal investments after going from a two-parent to single-mother
household is relatively large for boys. From column 3 of Table 1, boys in two-parent households
that eventually split are age 4.6 and get 16.7 hours in weekly paternal investments. On the other
hand, girls in the same household structure, from column 7, are of a similar age, 4.9 years old, but
receive a much smaller paternal investment, 13.2 hours per week. When the average paternal in-
vestment decreases drastically to near zero for both genders after the transition to a single-mother
household, there is more room for a decrease in paternal investments for boys. Another way to
see this is to compare average investments for boys in two-parent households that never split with
those who eventually split, 16.3 and 16.7, respectively, which are quite similar, despite the age
difference in the two groups. On the other hand, girls who are always in a two-parent household
receive about 15 hours per week in paternal investments, but those in a two-parent household that
eventually splits only receive about 13.2. Finally, consider the similarity in the estimated change
for boys, bˆM, - 7.5 hours when estimated by OLS and -7.3 when estimated by fixed effects. The
difference between the fixed effects and OLS estimates of bˆDi f f is through a difference in the es-
timates on the coefficient for girls, bˆF , which are -6.5 and -4.9 when estimated by OLS and fixed
effects, respectively.
While the boy-girl differences in paternal investments are both economically and statistically
important, it is possible that single-mothers compensate for the extra losses by increasing their in-
vestments to boys relative to girls. Columns 1 - 3 of Table 3 show the estimated differences in
total, weekday, and weekend maternal investments. From columns 2 and 3 of panel A, estimated
weekday and weekend maternal investments are smaller for boys and girls in single-mother house-
holds. However, both weekday and weekend maternal investments are relatively low for boys,
leading to estimated gaps of -0.19 for weekdays and -0.03 for weekends. From column 1 of panel
A, the estimated total weekly gender difference in maternal investments is -1.4, meaning that boys
suffer larger investment losses than girls of almost 1-1/2 hours per week. Adding the full set of
control variables changes the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms, but does not lead to
significant changes in the estimated gaps. Column 2 of panel B shows that the estimated gender
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gap in maternal weekday investments grows slightly in magnitude to -0.207. From column 3 of
panel B, the estimated gap in weekend investments is now -0.003. The total gap in maternal invest-
ments, from column 1 of panel B, is about -1.1, meaning that boys in single-mother homes receive
fewer maternal investments than girls in single-mother homes, and the magnitude is similar to the
estimated -1.4 hours per week from panel A. The negative estimate on the gap in total maternal
investments suggests that mothers do not compensate, but instead decrease their investments to
boys relative to girls. However, the standard error for the estimated difference is relatively large,
1.6, so we should not draw any strong conclusions based on that difference.
The analysis in Table 3 does not restrict the direction of the household transition, including
children who go from a two-parent household to a different household type, as well as those who
go from not living in a two-parent household to living with both parents. However, these two types
of transitions and families could be quite different from each other. One reason that we might
expect heterogeneity based on the direction of the transition is that the age that the child is in
each household structure is correlated with the direction of the transition. Differential gaps by age
could lead to different estimates when splitting the sample by the direction of the transition. Table
4 shows separate estimates by initial household structure. Columns 1 and 2 show estimates for
total weekly investments for families that were intact in the first wave, and columns 3 and 4 show
estimates for children with less than two parents in the household in the first period. From column
2, the estimated gender difference in total paternal investments for those who were in a two-parent
household in the first wave is -4.2 hours per week with a standard error of 1.54. Restricting to the
subsample of individuals who were in two-parent households in wave one increases the magnitude
of the estimated gap in paternal investments by almost 80 percent. However, the estimated gap in
maternal investments becomes positive, 0.688, after restricting to those in two-parent households
in the first wave. The positive sign on total maternal investments suggests that mothers might
compensate for the extra losses that boys suffer in paternal investments, but the estimate is noisy,
and much smaller in magnitude than the loss in paternal investments. If we take these estimates
at face value, then boys lose an additional 4.2 hours per week in paternal investments, about 70
percent of wave one average paternal investments, and mothers partially compensate for the loss
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with an additional 40 minutes per week. While the increase partially offsets the loss, about 17
percent of it, boys still suffer substantially larger investment losses from transitioning to a single-
mother home.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 display estimates when restricting to the subsample of individuals
who were not in a two-parent home in the first wave. There are fewer movers in this direction and
the standard errors are relatively large, but the estimates suggest that the direction of the move
likely matters. For example, the estimated gap in maternal investments in the subsample who were
not in two-parent homes in wave one is -3.5 hours per week. This estimate is of the opposite sign
from the subsample of children who were in two-parent homes in the first wave, and relatively large
in magnitude. In other words, this subsample is driving the negative estimates on total maternal
investments in the full sample. The estimated gap in paternal investments is still negative, -.18,
but much smaller in magnitude. Although there appears to be some heterogeneity based on the
direction of the transition, the estimates in the sample of children not in two-parent households
in the first wave are based on a relatively small number of transitions and the differences are not
statistically significant.
In addition to estimating differences in parental time investments, I include supplemental
estimates on the probability of having a positive investment. In this specification, I replace the
number of hours spent with the mother/father with a dummy variable for having any investment,
and estimate the differences using linear fixed effects regressions. From column 1 of Table 5, the
estimated change in the probability of receiving a nonzero maternal investment after transitioning
to a single-mother household is 0.040 for boys, and 0.068 for girls, leading to an estimated gen-
der gap of -0.028 in favor of girls. In other words, after the transition, girls see a relatively large
bump in their probability of having any investment from their mothers. However, the estimate is
noisy with a standard error of 0.033. Interestingly, the sign on the weekday and weekend maternal
investments estimates are different, with the estimated gap in receiving any weekday investment
favoring girls, and the estimated gap in weekend investments favoring boys. For paternal invest-
ments, the estimated gap in the probability of receiving any weekday investment is -0.08, meaning
that boys receive about an 8 percentage point more drastic change in the probability of receiving a
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positive paternal investment on weekdays. The analogous weekend estimate is -0.047. However,
the estimated gap in the total weekly probability is much smaller in absolute value than both the
weekday and weekend estimates, only -0.01. That suggests that, although boys see a relatively
large decrease in the probability of receiving an investment on any given day, the change in their
probability of receiving an investment at some point throughout the week is similar.
Splitting the sample by initial household composition reveals heterogeneity in the gender
gaps of the probability of receiving a positive paternal investment. From Panel A of Table 6, those
who lived with both parents in the first wave see a relatively large decrease in the probability of
receiving a positive paternal investment throughout the week, with an estimated difference of -
0.065. The estimated gap when looking at weekday or weekend investments only is -0.11 in both
cases, suggesting that on any given weekday or weekend day boys have an 11 percentage point
larger decrease in the probability of receiving a positive paternal investment. On the other hand,
the estimated gender gaps in paternal investments are positive for total, weekday, and weekend
investments for the subsample that lived with less than both parents in wave I, meaning that boys
in single-mother households were relatively well off by this measure. However, the estimates are
noisy in that subsample with an estimated gap for the week as a whole of 0.094 and a standard
error of 0.089.
4.1 Heterogeneity in Gender Gaps
Next, I consider heterogeneity in investment gender gaps by age and race. Because of the strong
correlation between investments and age, and differential age trends by gender and household
structure, one might expect that the boy-girl investment gap in single-mother households depends
on the age of the child. For example, Figures 5 and 6 show how the proportion of total parental
investments that come from the father increases with age for boys in two-parents households,
which suggests that paternal investments become increasingly important for boys as they get older.
Figures 3 and 4 provide insight to that trend by showing that gaps arise in boy and girl investments
with age, with fathers spending relatively more time with boys. Furthermore, the steep decline in
maternal investments from Figures 1 and 2 means that paternal investments become increasingly
19
important in the makeup of total investments for boys, but less so for girls. To compare the gender
gaps across ages, I group the individuals into four age bins (0 - 5, 6 - 10, 11 - 15, and 16 and
over) and estimate the gap for each bin. Panel A of Table 7 shows the estimates for total maternal
investments by age bin. The smallest gap, -0.6 hours per week, is in the 6 - 10 year old bin. From
there, the gap size increases to about -1 hour per week in the 11 - 15 year old bin, and then to -2.2
hours per week in the 16 and over bin. There is some suggestive evidence that relative losses for
boys increase as they get older, but the estimates are noisy, all with standard errors of 1.8 or higher.
Panel B of Table 7 shows estimates for paternal investments by age bin. A clear pattern
emerges in the paternal investment gaps, with boys suffering greater investment losses with age.
The smallest estimate is -0.4 hours per week for ages 0 - 5, but they increase in magnitude with
each age bin. The rest of the estimated gaps are -1.8 hours per week for 6 - 10 year olds, -3.3 for
11 - 15 year olds, and -3.6 for the 16 and over age group with p-values of 0.12, 0.006 and 0.02,
respectively. The pattern in these estimated differences supports the idea that paternal investments
become increasingly important for boys as they get older, leading to relatively large investment
losses during adolescence.
I also estimate differential gaps by race, focusing on the white and black subsamples, as those
two races make up more than 90 percent of the sample of children who made a transition from a
two-parent to less than two-parent household. From Table 8, the estimated gender gap in total
maternal investments for white children in single-mother households is -3.1 hours per week with
a standard error of 2.5. The estimated differences for black children in single-mother households
is -1.4 hours per week with a standard error of about 2.3. Both of the point estimates are larger
in magnitude than the overall estimate, but the estimates are noisy and not statistically different
from zero at any standard significance level. The estimated difference in paternal investments for
white children in single-mother households is about -4 hours per week, and is strongly statistically
significant with a standard error of 1.6. That estimate is similar in magnitude to the overall esti-
mated gap for the subsample of children who were in two-parent households in the first wave. The
estimate for the black subsample is about half the size, -2 hours per week, which is similar to the
estimated gap across the full sample, and is less statistically significant, with a standard error of
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1.4. While all four of the estimated gaps are negative, the differences provide some evidence that
the extra losses suffered by boys who are white are larger in terms of both maternal and paternal
investments. Parental investments are also larger on average across the sample of white children,
which could drive part of the difference. For example, the average weekly maternal investment for
white children in two-parent households is about 3 hours more per week than that for black chil-
dren in two-parent households (21.5 hours per week to 18.2 hours per week), and the difference in
weekly paternal investments is similar (14.5 hours per week to 10.9 hours per week).
4.2 Composition of the Investment Gaps
Using descriptions of the time diary activities, I estimate the gender gaps by activity type to deter-
mine which activities are the most important contributors to the overall differences. Table 9 dis-
plays fixed effects estimates of equation (1) by activity category.25 Column 1 provides estimates on
total maternal investments. Estimated gaps in maternal investments are positive on passive leisure
(0.22 hours per week), e.g. watching television, tending to needs (0.1 hours per week), and child-
care (0.18 hours per week), meaning that mothers increase time with boys relative to girls in those
activities after transitioning to a single-mother household. On the other hand, maternal investments
of active leisure decrease substantially more for boys in single-mother households. The estimate of
-0.85 hours per week in active leisure is the largest in magnitude of any activity. Boys also experi-
ence relatively large reductions in paternal investments in leisure, -0.72 and -0.75 hours per week
in passive and active leisure, respectively. In general, boys see a much larger drop-off in leisure
activity with their parents than girls do after transitioning to a single-mother household. The rest
of the estimates for paternal investments displayed in Table 9 are also negative, but generally of a
smaller magnitude than the estimates for leisure activity. The next two largest are the differences
in tending to needs, -0.48 hours per week, and entertainment, -0.21 hours per week.
25This is not a comprehensive set of the activities, but they account for the majority of the dif-
ferences. The estimates for the gaps in paternal investments displayed in Table 9 add up to a little
more than the total difference, -2.5 hours per week compared to -2.3. The displayed estimates for
maternal investments add up to about -0.7, which can account for 63% of the total gap.
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4.3 Household Structure and Child Behavior
One reason for analyzing gender gaps in the relationship between household structure and parental
investments is to assess the possibility that changes in investment levels contribute to non-cognitive
skill formation, explaining some of the differences we see in outcomes between boys and girls, e.g.
behavior and educational attainment. If the documented gaps in time investment losses from tran-
sitioning to single-mother households contribute to contemporaneous behavioral issues, then we
might expect to see changes in behavior that match the differential investment losses. In other
words, if the additional investment decreases that boys suffer is bad for their behavior, then we
would expect that to show up in measures of their behavior. I estimate the gender differential
changes in behavior from transitioning to single-mother households by replacing the outcome vari-
ables in equation (1), parental time investments, with measures of child behavior. One major weak-
ness of this exercise is that the behavioral measures, taken from the CDS, are parent-reported. This
is problematic because parental perceptions of their child’s behavior could change differentially
by gender around household structure transitions. Nonetheless, I show results from the analysis to
demonstrate the concept.
Table 10 shows results from fixed effects estimation of equation (1), replacing the parental
investment outcomes with three parent-rated behavior measures: externalizing behavior, internaliz-
ing behavior, and positive behavior. Each of the ratings are the result of a sequence of questions that
the parent answers about the child.26 Each of the questions related to externalizing/internalizing
behavior are answered on a one through three scale, and the questions for positive behavior are
on a one through five scale. Parent responses to the questions were summed and the totals were
standardized within each wave. Higher scores in externalizing and internalizing behavior repre-
sent more problematic behavior, but a higher score on the positive behaviors measure represents
less problematic behavior. Interestingly, The estimated coefficient on the male interaction with
single-mother household in the equation for externalizing behavior is negative, -0.11, meaning that
parents rate their boys as displaying less externalizing behavior following the transition. On the
other hand, the coefficient on the female interaction term is positive, 0.16, meaning that parents
26Due to minor differences in the questions across the three waves, I use the raw responses to
standardize the set of questions contributing to each behavioral measure
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report that girls act out more frequently following the transition. The externalizing behavior ratings
for boys become much more favorable following the transition to a single-mother household, rel-
ative to girls, and the estimated gap in changes in externalizing behavior, from column 1, is -0.27
standard deviations. The result is also statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.02. Apparently,
the change in household structure is not leading to more externalizing behavior for boys, accord-
ing to the parent-rated measure, like we might have expected based on the additional investment
losses. The estimated gaps in the other two measures are much smaller in magnitude, -0.007 for
internalizing behavior and 0.11 for positive behavior. The estimated gap in externalizing behavior
is surprising, but this gap should be estimated using measures that are not based on parent ratings
in future work.
5 Conclusion
Determining the mechanisms that lead to gender gaps in non-cognitive skills is largely an open
question [Bertrand and Pan, 2013, Jacob, 2002, Autor et al., 2016b]. Gender gaps in non-cognitive
skills among adolescents could arise for several reasons, including gender differences in returns to
and levels of inputs in single-mother and two-parent households. Disentangling the contributions
of mechanisms leading to non-cognitive differences is complicated by the presence of many inputs,
most of which are correlated with household structure, and difficult to measure and interpret. Us-
ing time diary data from the Child Development Supplement to the PSID, I obtain direct measures
of parental time investments and estimate gender differences in time investments around changes
in household composition. Although both boys and girls see significant reductions in parental
investments when living in single-mother homes, boys experience larger decreases in paternal in-
vestments of about 2.3 hours per week, more than 20 percent of the average paternal investment in
the first wave of the CDS. The additional loss in paternal investments is strongest through weekday
investments, 24 minutes per weekday, which explains about 80 percent of the total loss. There is
no strong evidence that mothers compensate for the extra loss by increasing investments to boys
following a change in household structure, relative to girls. Additional losses for boys are generally
increasing with age, with the estimated gap in total paternal investments over 3.3 hours per week
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for boys during adolescence. This is especially important, because non-cognitive skills continue
to develop through adolescence [Heckman and Mosso, 2014]. Differences in leisure activities ac-
count for about 60 percent of the gender gap in paternal investment losses.
Finding differential investment losses by gender suggests that living in a single-mother
household could have a large negative impact on the quantity of investments that boys receive
relative to girls. All of this evidence considered together with existing research suggests that time
investments are another potential mechanism that may help explain the non-cognitive skill gender
gap, specifically for those in single-mother households. However, using parent-reported ratings
of externalizing and positive behavior from the CDS, I find that parents rate their girls as having
higher levels of externalizing behavior and lower levels of positive behavior when in single-mother
households, relative to boys. Future research should consider a more direct link between time in-
vestments and outcomes, focusing on measures of non-cognitive skills that are not based on parent
ratings.
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Table 1: Wave I Summary by Gender & Household Structure
Boys-No Change Boys-Change Girls-No Change Girls-Change
Both <2 Both <2 Both <2 Both <2
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Mother’s Investments
Total 24.802 18.847 25.568 18.116 26.608 21.694 27.455 21.946
(15.206) (15.226) (15.264) (17.029) (15.486) (19.368) (15.495) (18.872)
Weekday 3.073 2.289 3.100 2.238 3.199 2.705 3.301 2.803
(2.415) (2.291) (2.372) (2.554) (2.477) (3.074) (2.566) (2.606)
Weekend 4.719 3.701 5.035 3.464 5.306 4.085 5.476 3.964
(3.206) (3.266) (3.156) (3.368) (3.192) (3.504) (3.195) (3.681)
Father’s Investments
Total 16.371 3.531 16.771 5.056 15.061 2.218 13.246 5.160
(11.397) (7.945) (13.147) (9.518) (11.440) (6.621) (10.919) (8.650)
Weekday 1.618 0.351 1.872 0.498 1.493 0.241 1.382 0.586
(1.615) (1.047) (2.125) (1.269) (1.712) (0.927) (1.697) (1.123)
Weekend 4.141 0.887 3.705 1.284 3.797 0.506 3.167 1.116
(3.284) (2.139) (3.001) (2.717) (3.158) (1.686) (2.910) (2.112)
Age 6.533 7.288 4.617 6.283 6.848 7.366 4.931 5.540
(3.850) (3.626) (3.149) (3.214) (3.847) (3.774) (3.430) (3.429)
# Bio Sibs 1.309 1.191 1.071 1.116 1.272 1.163 1.138 1.000
In HH (1.102) (1.145) (0.968) (1.011) (0.983) (1.074) (1.094) (1.035)
White 0.630 0.257 0.490 0.279 0.672 0.258 0.478 0.292
Black 0.219 0.646 0.471 0.581 0.164 0.653 0.434 0.597
Hispanic 0.094 0.047 0.006 0.093 0.106 0.036 0.038 0.028
Stepmother
In HH 0.036 0.035 0.014 0.028
Out of HH 0.090 0.105 0.093 0.042
Stepfather
In HH 0.126 0.151 0.127 0.083
Out of HH 0.032 0.023 0.043 0.083
Parents in HH 0.968 0.897 0.968 0.862
and Married
Observations 754 444 155 86 720 418 159 72
*Notes: This table displays averages by gender and household type with standard deviations in parentheses.
Columns labeled No Change contain numbers for children who have no change in household structure in
the sample, and those labeled Change contain numbers for children who undergo some change in household
structure. Columns labeled Both display numbers for children who have both biological/adoptive parents in
the household during the first wave, and those labeled <2 are for those with less than two biological/adoptive
parents in the household during the first wave.
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Table 2: OLS Estimates of Gender Gaps in Time Investments
Mother Father
Total Weekday Weekend Total Weekday Weekend
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Single Mother HH X
Male 1.243 0.009 0.620 -7.567 -0.774 -1.791
(0.963) (0.158) (0.214) (0.743) (0.102) (0.209)
Female 1.139 0.058 0.430 -6.548 -0.699 -1.489
(1.001) (0.163) (0.221) (0.725) (0.099) (0.209)
Other -11.513 -1.537 -1.881 -2.069 -0.135 -0.607
(0.999) (0.159) (0.229) (0.936) (0.127) (0.238)
Male - Female 0.103 -0.049 0.190 -1.019 -0.076 -0.302
(Standard Error) (0.699) (0.106) (0.164) (0.441) (0.0596) (0.126)
Observations 6,699 6,786 6,726 6,699 6,786 6,726
R-squared 0.280 0.233 0.163 0.269 0.157 0.229
*Notes: This table displays estimates from OLS regressions of time investments on child gender
interacted with a dummy for being in a single-mother household. The omitted category is a
household with both biological parents present. The fourth row displays the difference in the
male and female interaction coefficients. Each regression includes controls for the number of
biological siblings in the household, CDS wave, a marriage indicator for parents in the same
household, dummy variables for having stepparents in/out of the household, gender interactions
with age and age-squared, and a male dummy variable. Standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered by individual.
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Estimates of Gender Gaps in Time Investments
Panel A: No Controls
Mother Father
Total Weekday Weekend Total Weekday Weekend
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Single Mother HH X
Male -5.550 -0.707 -0.905 -10.346 -1.222 -2.077
(1.229) (0.186) (0.266) (0.933) (0.131) (0.232)
Female -4.146 -0.509 -0.872 -8.425 -0.839 -2.032
(1.388) (0.209) (0.302) (0.767) (0.114) (0.200)
Other -15.549 -2.023 -2.611 -6.057 -0.711 -1.291
(1.451) (0.203) (0.332) (1.116) (0.151) (0.301)
Male - Female -1.405 -0.198 -0.033 -1.921 -0.383 -0.044
(Standard Error) (1.799) (0.270) (0.390) (1.166) (0.167) (0.297)
Observations 6,699 6,786 6,726 6,699 6,786 6,726
R-squared 0.031 0.022 0.019 0.061 0.037 0.041
Individuals 3,283 3,308 3,287 3,283 3,308 3,287
Panel B: With Controls
Mother Father
Total Weekday Weekend Total Weekday Weekend
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Single Mother HH X
Male 1.273 0.007 0.558 -7.306 -0.903 -1.332
(1.713) (0.274) (0.358) (1.235) (0.173) (0.318)
Female 2.442 0.214 0.562 -4.941 -0.503 -1.105
(1.863) (0.281) (0.396) (1.135) (0.159) (0.312)
Other -7.433 -1.036 -1.109 -2.260 -0.342 -0.314
(1.948) (0.296) (0.409) (1.365) (0.191) (0.354)
Male - Female -1.169 -0.207 -0.003 -2.364 -0.400 -0.227
(Standard Error) (1.612) (0.243) (0.372) (1.084) (0.158) (0.289)
Observations 6,699 6,786 6,726 6,699 6,786 6,726
R-squared 0.260 0.226 0.136 0.118 0.070 0.094
Individuals 3,283 3,308 3,287 3,283 3,308 3,287
*Notes: This table displays estimates from fixed effects regressions of time investments on child
gender interacted with a dummy for being in a single-mother household. The omitted category
is a household with both biological parents present. The fourth row of each panel displays the
difference in the male and female interaction coefficients. Regressions in Panel A do not use
any control variables. Each regression in Panel B includes controls for the number of biological
siblings in the household, CDS wave, a marriage indicator for parents in the same household,
dummy variables for having stepparents in/out of the household, and gender interactions with
age and age-squared. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by individual.
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Table 4: Gender Gaps in Investments by Initial HH Structure
Both in Wave 1 <2 in Wave 1
Mother Father Mother Father
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Single Mother HH X
Male 1.948 -9.034 3.197 0.344
(2.137) (1.644) (3.259) (1.737)
Female 1.259 -4.800 6.738 0.530
(2.167) (1.543) (3.682) (1.487)
Other -9.022 -2.865 -4.197 3.323
(2.761) (2.119) (3.319) (1.728)
Male - Female 0.688 -4.234 -3.541 -0.186
(Standard Error) (2.028) (1.540) (2.876) (1.668)
Observations 4,284 4,284 2,415 2,415
R-squared 0.288 0.146 0.219 0.068
Individuals 1,998 1,998 1,285 1,285
*Notes: This table displays estimates from fixed effects regressions
of total weekly time investments on child gender interacted with a
dummy for being in a single-mother household. The omitted cate-
gory is a household with both biological parents present. Columns
1 and 2 restrict to the sample of children who were in a two-parent
household in the first wave, and columns 3 and 4 restrict to those
who were not living with both parents in the first wave. The fourth
row displays the difference in the male and female interaction coeffi-
cients. Each regression controls for the number of biological siblings
in the household, CDS wave, a marriage indicator for parents in the
same household, dummy variables for having stepparents in/out of
the household, and gender interactions with age and age-squared.
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by individual.
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Table 5: FE Gender Gaps in Probability of PTI>0
Mother Father
Total Weekday Weekend Total Weekday Weekend
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Single Mother HH X
Male 0.040 0.047 0.055 -0.419 -0.377 -0.331
(0.032) (0.043) (0.044) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Female 0.068 0.107 0.041 -0.409 -0.297 -0.285
(0.033) (0.044) (0.044) (0.052) (0.056) (0.050)
Other -0.435 -0.414 -0.364 -0.187 -0.094 -0.071
(0.052) (0.060) (0.057) (0.059) (0.065) (0.057)
Male - Female -0.028 -0.060 0.014 -0.010 -0.080 -0.047
(Standard Error) (0.033) (0.039) (0.044) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049)
Observations 6,699 6,786 6,726 6,699 6,786 6,726
R-squared 0.152 0.155 0.133 0.202 0.117 0.178
Individuals 3,283 3,308 3,287 3,283 3,308 3,287
*Notes: This table displays estimates from fixed effects regressions of a dummy variable for
having a positive time investment on child gender interacted with a dummy for being in a
single-mother household. The omitted category is a household with both biological parents
present. The fourth row displays the difference in the male and female interaction coefficients.
Each regression controls for the number of biological siblings in the household, CDS wave, a
marriage indicator for parents in the same household, dummy variables for having stepparents
in/out of the household, and gender interactions with age and age-squared. Standard errors are
in parentheses and clustered by individual.
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Table 6: Gender Gaps in Probability of PTI>0 by Initial HH Structure
Panel A: Both Parents in HH in Wave 1
Mother Father
Total Weekday Weekend Total Weekday Weekend
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Single Mother HH X
Male 0.009 0.049 -0.007 -0.595 -0.507 -0.449
(0.035) (0.052) (0.052) (0.058) (0.068) (0.064)
Female 0.012 0.074 -0.023 -0.530 -0.397 -0.338
(0.034) (0.051) (0.049) (0.060) (0.069) (0.061)
Other -0.452 -0.417 -0.432 -0.138 0.016 -0.042
(0.081) (0.092) (0.075) (0.079) (0.096) (0.081)
Male - Female -0.003 -0.025 0.016 -0.065 -0.110 -0.110
(Standard Error) (0.034) (0.049) (0.053) (0.058) (0.065) (0.061)
Observations 4,284 4,323 4,293 4,284 4,323 4,293
R-squared 0.142 0.147 0.146 0.304 0.149 0.226
Individuals 1,998 2,006 1,996 1,998 2,006 1,996
Panel B: Less Than Two Parents in HH in Wave 1
Mother Father
Total Weekday Weekend Total Weekday Weekend
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Single-Mother HH X
Male 0.126 0.066 0.125 0.004 -0.022 0.031
(0.070) (0.087) (0.093) (0.101) (0.087) (0.099)
Female 0.159 0.166 0.111 -0.090 -0.025 -0.035
(0.076) (0.094) (0.091) (0.098) (0.097) (0.088)
Other -0.358 -0.393 -0.276 0.051 0.072 0.140
(0.077) (0.092) (0.102) (0.097) (0.093) (0.092)
Male - Female -0.033 -0.101 0.013 0.094 0.0026 0.066
(Standard Error) (0.076) (0.081) (0.084) (0.089) (0.089) (0.084)
Observations 2,415 2,463 2,433 2,415 2,463 2,433
R-squared 0.172 0.173 0.129 0.102 0.080 0.112
Individuals 1,285 1,302 1,291 1,285 1,302 1,291
*Notes: This table displays estimates from fixed effects regressions of a dummy variable for
having a positive time investment on child gender interacted with a dummy for being in a single-
mother household. The omitted category is a household with both biological parents present.
Panel A restricts to the sample of children who were in a two-parent household in the first wave,
and Panel B restricts to those who were not living with both parents in the first wave. The fourth
row of each panel displays the difference in the male and female interaction coefficients. Each
regression controls for the number of biological siblings in the household, CDS wave, a marriage
indicator for parents in the same household, dummy variables for having stepparents in/out of the
household, and gender interactions with age and age-squared. Standard errors are in parentheses
and clustered by individual.
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Table 7: Gender Gaps By Age
Panel A: Mothers
Mother - Total Weekly Investment
Ages 0 - 5 Ages 6 - 10 Ages 11 - 15 16 and Over
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Single Mother HH X
Male 1.093 2.112 2.235 -2.451
(2.096) (1.815) (1.833) (2.175)
Female 2.486 2.725 3.295 -0.205
(2.484) (1.975) (1.976) (2.403)
Male - Female -1.393 -0.612 -1.060 -2.246
(Standard Error) (2.671) (1.844) (1.843) (2.526)
Observations 6,699 6,699 6,699 6,699
Individuals 3,283 3,283 3,283 3,283
Panel B: Fathers
Father - Total Weekly Investment
Ages 0 - 5 Ages 6 - 10 Ages 11 - 15 16 and Over
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Single Mother HH X
Male -9.701 -7.477 -5.321 -4.231
(1.428) (1.274) (1.311) (1.577)
Female -9.290 -5.610 -1.991 -0.633
(1.251) (1.209) (1.177) (1.325)
Male - Female -0.411 -1.867 -3.331 -3.598
(Standard Error) (1.399) (1.211) (1.203) (1.590)
Observations 6,699 6,699 6,699 6,699
Individuals 3,283 3,283 3,283 3,283
*Notes: Each panel displays estimates from a fixed effects regression of total
weekly time investments on child gender interacted with a dummy for being in
a single-mother household for four different age groups. The omitted category
is a household with both biological parents present. The third row of each panel
displays the difference in the male and female interaction coefficients. Each
regression controls for the number of biological siblings in the household, CDS
wave, a marriage indicator for parents in the same household, dummy variables
for having stepparents in/out of the household, and gender interactions with age
and age-squared. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by individual.
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Table 8: Gender Gaps by Race
Mother Father
White Black White Black
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Single Mother HH X
Male -0.300 1.635 -9.461 -6.390
(2.091) (2.018) (1.561) (1.417)
Female 2.866 3.085 -5.462 -4.373
(2.352) (2.244) (1.362) (1.294)
Male - Female -3.166 -1.450 -3.999 -2.017
(Standard Error) (2.500) (2.296) (1.658) (1.426)
Observations 6,699 6,699 6,699 6,699
Individuals 3,283 3,283 3,283 3,283
*Notes: This table displays estimates from a fixed effects regres-
sion of total weekly time investments on child gender interacted
with a dummy for being in a single-mother household by race.
The omitted category is a household with both biological par-
ents present. The third row displays the difference in the male
and female interaction coefficients. Each regression controls for
the number of biological siblings in the household, CDS wave,
a marriage indicator for parents in the same household, dummy
variables for having stepparents in/out of the household, and gen-
der interactions with age and age-squared.Standard errors are in
parentheses and clustered by individual.
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Table 9: Gender Gaps by Activity Type
Mother Father
[1] [2]
Passive Leisure 0.222 -0.723
(0.749) (0.461)
Active Leisure -0.858 -0.753
(0.565) (0.426)
Entertainment -0.060 -0.212
(0.369) (0.330)
Tending to Needs 0.100 -0.483
(0.567) (0.365)
Obtaining Goods and Services -0.182 -0.195
(0.445) (0.265)
Household Activity -0.175 -0.121
(0.222) (0.097)
Childcare 0.183 -0.005
(0.171) (0.015)
Observations 6,699 6,699
Individuals 3,283 3,283
*Notes: Each estimate is from a fixed effects regression of
weekly time investments for a specific activity category on child
gender interacted with a dummy for being in a single-mother
household. The omitted category is a household with both bi-
ological parents present. Each estimate is from the difference
in the male and female interaction coefficients. Each regression
controls for the number of biological siblings in the household,
CDS wave, a marriage indicator for parents in the same house-
hold, dummy variables for having stepparents in/out of the house-
hold, and gender interactions with age and age-squared. Standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered by individual.
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Table 10: Child Behavior and HH Structure
Externalizing Internalizing Positive
Behavior Behavior Behavior
[1] [2] [3]
Single Mother HH X
Male -0.113 0.009 -0.008
(0.134) (0.136) (0.129)
Female 0.160 0.016 -0.117
(0.136) (0.145) (0.137)
Other -0.163 -0.092 0.146
(0.143) (0.157) (0.148)
Male - Female -0.273 -0.007 0.110
(Standard Error) (0.117) (0.123) (0.132)
Observations 6,060 6,058 6,078
R-squared 0.026 0.027 0.010
Number of Individuals 3,200 3,193 3,197
*Notes: This table displays estimates from fixed effects regressions of
parent rated child behaviors on child gender interacted with a dummy for
being in a single-mother household. The omitted category is a house-
hold with both biological parents present. The fourth row displays the
difference in the male and female interaction coefficients. Each regres-
sion includes controls for the number of biological siblings in the house-
hold, CDS wave, a marriage indicator for parents in the same household,
dummy variables for having stepparents in/out of the household, and gen-
der interactions with age and age-squared. Standard errors are in paren-
theses and clustered by individual.
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A Supplemental Results
Table A1: FE Estimates of Gender Gaps with Day of Week FEs
Mother Father
Total Weekday Weekend Total Weekday Weekend
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Single-Mother HH X
Male 1.250 0.010 0.539 -7.339 -0.901 -1.357
(1.711) (0.273) (0.359) (1.245) (0.175) (0.317)
Female 2.370 0.211 0.535 -5.131 -0.509 -1.139
(1.865) (0.279) (0.396) (1.142) (0.160) (0.310)
Other -7.493 -1.044 -1.144 -2.311 -0.345 -0.358
(1.941) (0.293) (0.408) (1.381) (0.193) (0.353)
Male - Female -1.120 -0.200 0.004 -2.207 -0.392 -0.218
(Standard Error) (1.617) (0.244) (0.372) (1.084) (0.159) (0.288)
Observations 6,699 6,786 6,726 6,699 6,786 6,726
R-squared 0.263 0.230 0.138 0.126 0.078 0.099
Number of Individuals 3,283 3,308 3,287 3,283 3,308 3,287
*Notes: This is a replication of the main fixed effects estimates from Table 3, Panel B, but
includes indicators for day of the week. For the total weekly time regression, there is a dummy
included for each weekday-weekend day combination, with one combination excluded. Standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered by individual.
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Table A2: Gender Gaps in Investments
by Initial HH Structure (Day of Week FE)
Both in Wave 1 <2 in Wave 1
Mother Father Mother Father
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Single-Mother HH X
Male 1.849 -9.417 3.246 0.329
(2.145) (1.642) (3.252) (1.725)
Female 1.192 -5.289 6.861 0.483
(2.162) (1.549) (3.743) (1.465)
Other -9.097 -3.034 -4.231 3.302
(2.700) (2.161) (3.349) (1.724)
Male - Female 0.657 -4.128 -3.615 -0.154
(Standard Error) (2.037) (1.534) (2.896) (1.642)
Observations 4,284 4,284 2,415 2,415
R-squared 0.292 0.160 0.224 0.080
Number of Individuals 1,998 1,998 1,285 1,285
*Notes: This is a replication of the main fixed effects estimates by ini-
tial household structure from Table 4, but includes indicators for day
of the week. For the total weekly time regression, there is a dummy
included for each weekday-weekend day combination, with one com-
bination excluded. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by
individual.
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